To whom it may concern,
I am writing this from a place of genuine concern about the way that we talk about interventionism and the idea of moral war. As the United States stands on the precipice of another invasion in Central America in the name of deposing Venezuelan president Nicolás Maduro, and years into the continued perpetuation of the genocide in Palestine under the pretense of liberating the people of Gaza, I was surprised by the rhetoric demonstrated in an article published early this month in an issue of The Weekly titled “Opinion: The streets of Sudan are as red as our flag’s stripes, and she’s nowhere to stop this” written by Seth Buckwalter ‘28. The article felt, at times, outright militaristically dogmatic in a piece which otherwise seemed to advocate against the type of violence that armed intervention perpetuates. Buckwalter advocated against anti-interventionism, insisting that there “needs to be a global defender for freedom,” presumably, the United States. It’s hard for me to square that with my recollection of the United States being formally engaged in their Global War on Terror for most of my life, it would be challenging to say the world has been made any more peaceful.
The problem with insisting that there be a nation who is deputized to act as the world police is that there is no objective metric for what keeping that peace justifies. After all, who decides what freedom is, and who decides what it means to defend it? Under what Buckwalter described as “corporate colonialism,” it would always be the intervening dominant power, and I believe that no imperialist nation would ever take the aspirational moral stance that he suggested. I would argue that the United States has never “[had] the moral compass and commitment we need to intervene in these places,” as quoted in Buckwalter’s article, and that it’s dangerous to imply that we might’ve, because it situates us within the context in which we can be sold future wars under the justification of relating to some past “moral war” which never existed. However, I don’t think that Buckwalter was coming from an intentionally ill-intentioned place when he argued in favor of aggressive intervention. For longer than the duration of our lifetimes the United States has been engaged in concerted efforts to control the story that its citizens and supporters tell about war, and the creation of the myth of moral interventionism is a key part of that.
The problem with insisting that there be a nation who is deputized to act as the world police is that there is no objective metric for what keeping that peace justifies.
When, in his piece, Buckwalter asked the reader to imagine a United States government “that forcibly intervened on behalf of a people when their government is oppressing them” and concluded that would be “truly the most American goal to ever exist,” I believe he failed to imagine what that sort of intervention might actually look like. For example, we can look at the United States’ first boots-on-the-ground invasion following the Cold War, Operation Just Cause in Panama (which should feel incredibly familiar for anyone following the current Operation Southern Spear outside of Venezuela). When the United States invaded Panama in 1989 to depose General Manuel Noriega it was, ostensibly, exactly the type of ‘liberatory’ act that Buckwalter called for: an oppressive de facto dictator deposed through military intervention, and a democracy that was successfully instated as the result. Noriega, of course, had been a U.S. asset since he began studying at the School of the Americas in 1966, and throughout the 1980s the U.S. was more than happy to turn a blind eye to his smuggling of drugs into the States, so long as he continued to assist the U.S. in illegally smuggling weapons to the Anti-Communist Contras in their insurgency against the Nicaraguan government, which I would also describe as a form of intervention (see, again: YAF will send Oliver North to your campus for free and you can ask him about this yourself). At the point at which Noriega stopped collaborating with the U.S. and became instead an inconvenience to their warmongering, bombs were falling on Panama City, and he was violently deposed within the year.
Operation Just Cause was a storytelling act as much as a military operation. In a post-mortem analysis of the United States action in Panama, Major William J. Conley Jr. wrote that the name of the operation was changed from its original Blue Spoon to Just Cause “to reinforce the just action of intervention, jus ad bellum.” The United States government believed that they could rally their citizens to war with as little as a pun and a vague declaration of their defending democracy. It worked. In the days following the invasion, the Los Angeles Times reported that 77% of Americans believed that the attacks were “morally justified” in the name of bringing democracy to the country, and safeguarding American lives. Even if Pete Hegseth’s Department of War has moved itself slightly away from snarky humor in its invasion titles, the result remains the same: they are in the practice of selling the United States on the belief that just war is possible.
Furthermore the idea that we might be able to individually judge which military action is justified is how war is sold to the first world. Morality is not an objective truth we can judge violent action by, it is a marketable commodity, and it is, whether or not we realize it, a deliberately constructed cultural narrative.
I think Buckwalter was wrong when he said the United States might one day engage in “conflict solely for the protection of self-determination and preservation of human dignity” because, I think, there is no moral war, there is only the false belief in it. Furthermore the idea that we might be able to individually judge which military action is justified is how war is sold to the first world. Morality is not an objective truth we can judge violent action by, it is a marketable commodity, and it is, whether or not we realize it, a deliberately constructed cultural narrative. I believe a single nation becoming the global defender of freedom is fundamentally impossible, and the story that it has ever been is a lie that predicates trillions of dollars that the United States spends annually on the perpetuation of the global industries of warfare. A modern nation can never be a global military force engaged in war for the sake of the oppressed, but the fact that they can sell their citizens on more violence with the hope that one day they might become one is evidence that the lie works.
Onwards,
Ian Graybill ‘26
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